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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880612-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Text of Statutes and 
Constitutional Provisions, Statement of the Case, and Statement of 
the Facts are set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief at v, 1-4. 
Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to Respondent's argument 
in Points I and II of its brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Christofferson's fifth amendment right to counsel was 
violated when he stated that counsel already had been appointed to 
him and no clarification of his comment was sought. There is no 
evidence of a clear intent to waive this right and the reading of 
Miranda warnings by themselves cannot establish clarification or 
waiver. 
Mr. Christofferson did not waive his right to remedy of a 
discovery violation since there was an objection raised before the 
court and relief sought. Even though there was other evidence of 
guilt, the discovery violation created substantial taint on the jury 
deliberation process requiring reversal of his conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR, CHRISTOFFERSONS1 FIFTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED, 
(Reply to Respondent's Point I) 
A. TWO STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPLY TO THE 
DISCUSSION UNDER POINT I OF APPELLANTfS OPENING 
BRIEF. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point IA) 
It is true, as the State asserts in its brief at page 10, 
that factual determinations made by the trial court are reviewed 
under the "clearly erroneous" standard. See State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987). However, if clear error is found and 
that error infringes upon a federal constitutional right, then a 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis must be applied to the 
case. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967); State v. 
Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987). A violation of the 
accused's Miranda rights and fifth amendment right to counsel 
demands that the harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
be applied. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1986). That 
standard is more fully set out on page 20 of Mr. Christofferson's 
Opening Brief. The State has the burden of proof in this matter. 
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
[T]he beneficiary of a constitutional error [must] 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained. 
Id. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR WITH 
RESPECT TO ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS CONCERNING THE 
PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point IB) 
Respondent takes issue with two statements in 
Mr. Christoffersons's Opening Brief. Both go to erroneous rulings 
by the trial court. First, the State takes issue with Appellant's 
statement that a transportation officer "would have taken the 
defendant to court the day after his arrest" (Br. of App. at 11). 
The State points out that there is no evidence that Officer Probert 
specifically took the Defendant to court (Br. of Res. at 11). While 
there is no evidence that Officer Probert ever came in contact with 
Mr. Christofferson, Officer Probert's testimony establishes that, 
according to normal procedure, the day after his arrest 
Mr. Christofferson would most likely have been taken before a 
magistrate for a probable cause hearing (R. 122 at 20). 
Therefore, the judge's ruling that a probable cause 
hearing could not possibly have been held is clearly erroneous 
(R. 35). 
The State also takes issue with Appellant's statement 
that the officers involved "had the impression Mr. Christofferson 
appeared in court and a lawyer was appointed" (Br. of App. at 11). 
It is true that only one officer testified that he thought 
Mr. Christofferson believed he had been appointed an attorney 
(R. 122 at 4-5 & 14). While the officer may not actually have 
believed or had the impression that an attorney had been appointed, 
he was aware that the Defendant had the impression that he had an 
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attorney. Most importantly, the officer was put on notice that 
there might have been a previous invocation of rights by 
Mr. Christofferson. The officer took no steps to investigate the 
potentially problematic assertion of the Defendant. Therefore, 
there is no evidence directly contradicting Mr. Christofferson1s 
assertion. His statement before being questioned by the police is 
some evidence that he invoked his right to counsel at the probable 
cause hearing. 
C. THE STATE HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN IN SHOWING 
THAT MR. CHRISTOFFERSON WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point IC) 
Respondent contends that the record shows that 
Mr. Christofferson made his arguably equivocal request for counsel 
before the Miranda warnings were given and that the Miranda warnings 
themselves acted as appropriate clarification of his equivocal 
request. 
The warnings themselves are a stronger 
clarification than if the detectives had asked 
what he meant. 
(Br. of Res. at 17). The State makes this assertion without citing 
any case law. 
The State's position misses the differences between the 
solution to the problem as announced in Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), and the solution offered by the clarification approach. 
Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), create a "rigid 
prophylactic rule" to protect an accused's right to counsel to 
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protect against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. 
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984). The problem is one of 
psychological coercion by the police in such a situation and the 
solution is to create a hard and fast rule: warnings must be given 
and if the right is in any way invoked, interrogation must cease. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. This protection is inflexible and 
invariable. Such a system is bound to create problems, and one of 
the obvious ones is the problem recognized but not decided in 
Smith. What happens if an interrogating officer cannot tell, if the 
right has been invoked? Smith notes three solutions to the 
problem. Id. at 96 n.3. The two extremes are equally as rigid as 
Miranda itself: either any reference to an attorney blocks 
interrogation or only those references passing some threshold of 
clarify block interrogation. 
The third Smith possibility adopted by this Court in 
State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988), is the 
clarification approach. This is a pragmatic rather than rigid 
approach. Id. at 969. If an equivocal request is made, the officer 
tries to clarify the nature of the request. The nature of the 
clarification must vary with the situation. This is as different 
from the use of the rigid Miranda warnings as a procedure can be. 
Criminal defendants are not often sophisticated or 
articulate. The clarificiation approach takes into account that 
lack of sophistication and ability to clearly communicate, just as 
Miranda seeks to protect rights of the accused as simply as 
possible. To have an accused in custody make any statement 
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concerning counsel must at least temporarily be viewed as an 
invocation of rights. Appropriate ad hoc clarification can 
adequately determine the accused's state of mind. 
However, when such a person makes a self-assertive 
statment concerning counsel and the response is a blank stare, 
refusing to pay attention to the remark or the opaque reciting of 
the Miranda warnings, clarification has not occurred. While most 
people would be dumbfounded by such a response, someone in custody 
would probably be intimidated into silence concerning the right to 
counsel. The accused has no burden to be articulate. State v. 
Wright, 477 A.2d 1265, 1268 (N.J. 1984); Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 
1173 (Alaska App. 1985). The clarification approach with its 
pragmatism burdens the officer to find out the accused's actual 
desire. A nonsequitor such as reciting the Miranda warnings does 
not meet this burden. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether the equivocal statement 
preceded the Miranda warning. Respondent is correct that Officer 
Christiansen's testimony at trial shows the factual sequence to be 
statement first, warnings second (R. 123 at 59). However, Officer 
Hutchison's testimony at the suppression hearing indicates that the 
opposite happened (R. 122 at 4-5). Detective Hutchison further 
indicates that no clarification took place: 
Q. Did you ask the attorney that might have been 
appointed to him when he appeared in court, 
[whether he] might be present before he answered 
any further questions? 
A. No. 
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(R. 122 at 7). Detective Christiansen claimed Mr. Christofferson 
indicated he would talk to me at that time without 
an attorney present. 
(R. 123 at 59). However, there is no record of how 
Mr. Christofferson indicated this or if this was just the 
detective's subjective belief. 
The State admits that the record is sparse (Br. of Res. 
at 16). It is also unclear as to the order of events and statements 
actually made. However, the one thing that is clear is that 
Mr. Christofferson made a statement concerning his attorney. He 
need prove nothing more than that. The State has the burden of 
proof on waiver of constitutional rights, and the sparse unclear 
record should not work in favor of the waiver of those rights. The 
inadequate record should not be held against the Defendant in this 
case. 
D. MR. CHRISTOFFERSONfS STATEMENT THAT HE THOUGHT 
COUNSEL MAY HAVE BEEN APPOINTED WAS AT LEAST AN 
EQUIVOCAL INVOCATION OF HIS RIGHT TO HAVE COUNSEL 
PRESENT. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point ID) 
Respondent relies on two cases to show that 
Mr. Christofferson's statement was not even an equivocal request for 
counsel. However, the cases differ factually from the present case. 
In Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987), the 
accused made it clear that he would talk to the officers but needed 
an attorney present before he would sign any written statement. Id. 
at 525. Barrett argued that an invocation for one purpose is an 
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invocation for all purposes. Id. at 527. Mr. Christofferson made 
no clear statement as to his intentions. His statement was 
ambiguous and its meaning in the circumstances was unclear. 
Barrett's command to not disregard the ordinary meaning of such 
statements does not apply to this case. There was no clear 
intention stated. Br. of Res. at 18. 
In Quadrini v. Clausen, 864 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1989), the 
reviewing courts found that the accused 
unequivocally and in clear and unambiguous terms 
stated that he did not want an attorney present. 
Id. at 582-83. Quadrini is a waiver case; the notion that any 
equivocal statement was made was rejected. Id. at 583 n.7. This 
was based not on the placing of calling cards on the table but on 
his clear and repeated waiver of his rights. Id. 
Mr. Christofferson made an equivocal statement. He made 
no repeated and unequivocal statement as to the waiver of his right 
to counsel. Mr. Christofferson stands by the equivocal invocation 
analysis contained in his opening brief and cases therein. (See 
Point IAii.) The Quadrini analysis does not apply to the present 
case. 
POINT II. A DISCOVERY VIOLATION OCCURRED THAT WAS 
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL TO MR. CHRISTOFFERSON. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point II) 
As outlined in Point II of Mr. Christofferson1s opening 
brief, the police officer who had obtained an incriminating 
statement from Mr. Christofferson had an additional contact with the 
- 8 -
D e f e n d a n t r!: 1 :i s c o i 1 1 a • :: t w a s , o f c o \ 11: s e , a 1 s o k n o w n t o 
Mr, Christofferson, but the officer's characterization of the 
encounter was not known * - r-" The prosecutor did not learn of 
this encounter until th- -..^  .• - . , A] t .1: lougl 1 suet i 
information had been requested in discovery by Mr, Christofferson, 
informal n mm nf I his undocumented encounter was not provided to 
counsel for the Defendant. (See Appellant's Opening Brief: ,) 
A. DEFENDANT HAS NOT WAIVED THIS ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point IIA) 
"]," I" i e 1.1 j a 1 i u d * j t- ij e j J I e d 1 1 ir Christoffer s o i I f s m o t i o n t o 
dismiss because the information was not known to the prosecutor or 
contained in any investigative report (R. 123 at 78-79). This is 
immaterial, however. 
At the outset we stress that we are concerned with 
more than the prosecutor's knowledge . . . 
Information known to police officers working on 
the case is charged to the prosecution since 
officers are part of the prosecution team 
(citations omitted). 
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984). Shabata holds that 
the prosecutor need not know the undisclosed information. Shabata 
by its facts she the material need not be contained in an 
investigative report. Id. at 787. This analysis is only just; 
otherwise, officers could conveniently fail to record any 
information that they di d i Iot wi si I t : ha /e di sc1osed to t he 
defendant. The judge's ruling was clearly erroneouos and should be 
overruled by thi s Co\ irt. 
The Respondent claims that Mr. Christofferson waived this 
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claim of error when he failed to ask for more appropriate relief 
than a dismissal. Respondent cites State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 
879, 882-83 (Utah 1988). In Griffiths, the defendant became aware 
of the previously undisclosed information prior to the day of 
trial. No continuance was requested, which would have been an 
appropriate and less burdensome remedy. Rather, the defendant asked 
for a mistrial. 
In the present case, Mr. Christofferson did not have the 
luxury of such foreknowledge. An objection to the testimony, while 
not inappropriate, might have been ineffective, since the jury would 
have heard the information any way. Striking the testimony would 
not necessarily cure the problem, either. Asking for a continuance 
after the information came in would be completely ineffective 
because the trial strategy had been chosen and revealed to the jury 
in opening arguments. However, even if any of the choices might 
have been effective, this Court should not second guess defense 
counsel's trial strategy, especially in a situation like this one in 
which the information was made available midtrial in front of the 
jury. 
Trial counsel vigorously cross-examined the officer and 
then, out of the presence of the jury, asked for a dismissal. 
Perhaps he could have asked for the information to be stricken. 
Yet, he chose not to draw more attention to the problem and to 
object out of the presence of the jury. Perhaps a mistrial would 
have been a less burdensome remedy. However, Griffiths does not 
command that defense counsel ask for the most appropriate or least 
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biirdensome r< *medy. Gritr ltn. ' " •*:s that waiver occurs w r -- -. -;. rial 
notice of undisclosed information is gained and counsel cot;., r othing 
to remedy the situation until trial. 
Here, the ir 1 forn i.a11oi 1 cai ne tc 11 ie a11entioi i of counse 1 
while j witness was on the stand. Counsel's options were severely 
limited a!., I his point. An appropriate objection was made and relief 
was requested. Waiver should not be found under U :ie present facts. 
B. THE DISCOVERY . -~= fT *- .rF " :"E TO 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point IIB) 
Respondent's analysis under the facts of this case misses 
an important point. 
The undisclosed conflicting statement to Detective 
C h r i st. i r»nr=iHri !>•; Itself creates a credibility problem. 
Mr. Christofferson 1s story is that he told the police the same thing 
throughout the case. Detective Christiansen fs testimony conflicts 
v - " -c 1—: :,:L-* in the jurors1 minds as to 
Mr. Christofferson 1s credibility. It is the earlier statement to 
Detective Christiansen that forms the bulk of the evidence against 
Mr. Christofferson. This is the pivotal point o£ t ;! Ie case. 
ItI closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that the case 
was a matter of deciding who "is telling you the truth11 (R. 124 at 
i n 'i T n a • - onsider Mr. Christof f erson1 s 
credibility, the prosecutor only pointed to the discrepancies in the 
Defendar statements to Detective Christiansen (R. 124 at 13-14). 
Finally, the prosecutor pointed to the instruction on credibility 
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(R. 124 at 14). In rebuttal, the first thing the prosecutor 
reemphasized was the allegedly variable stories told to Detective 
Christiansen (R. 124 at 26). 
The inconsistent statements allegedly made to the victim 
are of a different nature. First, this is not the crux of the 
case. Neither side spends much time arguing this discrepancy. The 
jury is less likely to be swayed by this sort of infighting between 
two ex-friends, who are now defendant and victim. In argument, 
Mr. Christofferson's counsel points out that "this is a strange 
relationship" (R. 124 at 21). From the testimony of both parties, 
it is clear that they have related to each other in a way that is 
unusual when weighed against the ordinary course of relationships. 
They are employer-employee, landlord-tenant, and friends with a 
vague system of paying each other for services. The jury was not 
likely to be troubled by these two men arguing over what they had 
told each other. 
The Respondent's analysis under prong two is also 
flawed. The State argues that there is substantial evidence to 
convict even without the conflicting statement. This is not a 
correct statement of the harmless error standard. A decision to 
reverse and remand must be based on the determination 
that absent the erroneous admission . . . , there 
was a reasonable likelihood that [the Defendant] 
might have obtained a more favorable result at 
trial, . . . 
State v. Mitchell, 116 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah 1989). Even if 
there is substantial evidence to support the conviction absent the 
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improperly introduced evidence, the conviction should be set aside. 
Id 
The reasonable likelihood question is not just the 
substantial evidence test in disguise; rather, it 
focuses on the taint caused by the error. If the 
taint it sufficient, it is irrelevant that there 
is sufficient untainted evidence to support a 
verdict. Any stricter interpretation of harmful 
error . , , runs the risk of substituting our 
judgment for that of the jury and could be 
criticized as encouraging the improper admission 
of evidence by de facto weakening the sanctions 
against it. 
Mr Christofferson has the right to a trial free from the 
d i f f :i c i 11 t :i e, 3 :i 1 n j: »o s e :i lb} t h e 1! a t e d I s c 1 o s 1 11: e o f t h I s e v i d e n c e 
CONCLUSION 
For uii; ijinl .ill ot t ho foregoing reasons, 
Mi: Christof ferson requests this Court to reverse the conviction and 
the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress with an order to 
suppress the evidence and dismiss the charges or provide for a new 
trial without such evidence. . 
R E S P E C T FI JI • I , Y S1 J B MIT T E D t h : ~ "' ^ 
A11 o r h e y for JDefend a nt / ' A ppe ] 1 a 1 11 
A t t o r n e y for Defendanl / f tppe 1 1 a n t 
ROBERT L. StTEELI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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